A large-scale malvertising campaign active since January 2026 has been observed targeting U.S.-based individuals searching for tax-related documents to serve rogue installers for ConnectWise ScreenConnect that drop a tool named HwAudKiller to blind security programs using the bring your own vulnerable driver (BYOVD) technique.

“The campaign abuses Google Ads to serve rogue ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) installers, ultimately delivering a BYOVD EDR killer that drops a kernel driver to blind security tools before further compromise,” Huntress researcher Anna Pham said in a report published last week.

The cybersecurity vendor said it identified over 60 instances of malicious ScreenConnect sessions tied to the campaign. The attack chain stands out for a couple of reasons. Unlike recent campaigns highlighted by Microsoft that leverage tax-themed lures, the newly flagged activity employs commercial cloaking services to avoid detection by security scanners and abuses a previously undocumented Huawei audio driver to disarm security solutions.

The exact objectives of the campaign are currently not clear; however, in at one instance, the threat actor is said to have leveraged the access to deploy the endpoint detection and response (EDR) killer and then dump credentials from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process memory, as well as use tools like NetExec for network reconnaissance and lateral movement.

These tactics, per Huntress, align with pre-ransomware or initial access broker behavior, suggesting that the threat actor is looking to either deploy ransomware or monetize the access by selling it to other criminal actors.

The attack begins when users search for terms like “W2 tax form” or “W-9 Tax Forms 2026” on search engines like Google, tricking them into clicking on sponsored search results that direct users to bogus sites like “bringetax[.]com/humu/” to trigger the delivery of the ScreenConnect installer.

What’s more, the landing page is protected by a PHP-based Traffic Distribution System (TDS) powered by Adspect, a commercial cloaking service, to ensure that a benign page is served to security scanners and ad review systems, while only real victims see the actual payload.

This is achieved by generating a fingerprint of the site visitor and sending it to the Adspect backend, which then determines the appropriate response. In addition to Adspect, the landing page’s “index.php” features a second cloaking layer powered by JustCloakIt (JCI) on the server side.

“The two cloaking services are stacked in the same index.php—JCI’s server-side filtering runs first, while Adspect provides client-side JavaScript fingerprinting as a second layer,” Pham explained.

The web pages lead to the distribution of ScreenConnect installers, which are then used to deploy multiple trial instances on the compromised host. The threat actor has also been found to drop additional Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools like FleetDeck Agent for redundancy and ensuring persistent remote access.

The ScreenConnect session is leveraged to drop a multi-stage crypter that acts as a conduit for an EDR killer codenamed HwAudKiller that uses the BYOVD technique to terminate processes associated with Microsoft Defender, Kaspersky, and SentinelOne. The vulnerable driver used in the attack is “HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys,” a legitimate, signed Huawei kernel driver designed for laptop audio hardware.

“The driver terminates the target process from kernel mode, bypassing any usermode protections that security products rely on. Because the driver is legitimately signed by Huawei, Windows loads it without complaint despite Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE),” Huntress noted.

The crypter, for its part, attempts to evade detection by allocating 2GB of memory and filling it with zeros, and then freeing it, effectively causing antivirus engines and emulators to fail due to high resource allocation.

It’s currently not known who is behind the campaign, but an exposed open directory in the threat actor-controlled infrastructure has revealed a fake Chrome update page containing JavaScript code with Russian-language comments. This alludes to a Russian-speaking developer in possession of a social engineering toolkit for malware distribution.

“This campaign illustrates how commodity tooling has lowered the barrier for sophisticated attacks,” Pham said. “The threat actor didn’t need custom exploits or nation-state capabilities, they combined commercially available cloaking services (Adspect and JustCloakIt), free-tier ScreenConnect instances, an off-the-shelf crypter, and a signed Huawei driver with an exploitable weakness to build an end-to-end kill chain that goes from a Google search to kernel-mode EDR termination.”

“A consistent pattern across compromised hosts was the rapid stacking of multiple remote access tools. After the initial rogue ScreenConnect relay was established, the threat actor deployed additional trial ScreenConnect instances on the same endpoint, sometimes two or three within hours, and backup RMM tools like FleetDeck.”